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Zusammenfassung
Der Aufsatz thematisiert einen Zeitraum (1780–1870), in dem sich im
Ostseeraum politisch und wirtschaftlich viel verändert. Für alle, die an den
Küsten der Ostsee lebten, war es das Meer, das Leben und
Lebensunterhalt regelte, Bräuche und Anschauungen beeinflusste und
Denken und Handeln bestimmte. In vielerlei Hinsicht bildeten die
Küstenbewohner charakteristische Gemeinschaften, die nur geringen
Bezug zu territorialen Grenzen und wenige Verbindungen zum Land hinter
den Handelswegen hatten. Der immer schnellere Puls des
Wirtschaftslebens, der Einfluss der technischen Errungenschaften und vor
allem die Entstehung mächtiger zentralistisch agierender Staaten
verursachten starke und langanhaltende Veränderungen. Der Aufsatz
untersucht den Einfluss nationaler Normen und Werte auf die maritimen
Gemeinschaften im Ostseeraum und richtet dabei besonderes Augenmerk
darauf, inwiefern das Meer, die Küste und die Küstenbewohner neu definiert
wurden, um in das nationale Selbstbild zu passen. Im Gegensatz zu
anderen derartigen Gemeinschaften (wie beispielsweise Bergvölkern)
lebten die die Küste bewohnenden in Gebieten, die in wirtschaftlicher,
strategischer und militärischer Hinsicht immer wichtiger wurden. Diese
mussten folglich in das nationale Ganze integriert werden. Weit in die
Vergangenheit reichende internationale Verbindungen und stark
ausgeprägte Traditionen in der Anpassung an veränderte Umstände
sorgten dafür, dass die Küstengebiete selbst engagiert an diesem
Veränderungsprozess teilnehmen konnten.
This article is based on a paper which formed part of a programme
section at the 45. Deutscher Historikertag (September 14th – 17th 2004)
in Kiel. The section dealt with different perspectives on writing Baltic Sea
history and also served as a starting point to establish a Baltic Sea
section within the International Committee of Historical Sciences. David
Kirby (Ph.D.) is Professor of Modern History at the University College
London and currently working on a history of Finland. Kontakt:
dkirby@ssees.ac.uk
Die Ostsee ist ein wesentlich germanisches Mittelmeer,
denn seit Jahrtausenden haben sich auf ihr vorzugsweise
Völker germanischen Stammes getummelt. Sie haben dort,
wie auf dem weiten Ozean, eine Hauptrolle gespielt und
stets ihr Übergewicht geltend gemacht, weil ihnen
Seebegabung in hohem Grade verliehen ist. Allerdings
wohnen von frühester Zeit her an den östlichen Gestaden
auch Völker von anderer Abkunft; aber die Menschen
tschudischen Stammes sind immer nur passive gewesen
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gebieten. Sie brachten es nie dahin, als eine seemächtige
Nation aufzutreten und bildeten keine unabhängigen
Staaten: Ihr geschichtliches Los bestand von jeher darin,
von anderen überflügelt zu werden [...].1
History and culture are not objective standards to which we
are obliged to adjust. They constitute a reservoir to be drawn
on by political projects […]. In the last instance, identity is a
question of who wants to see themselves as belonging. If
Lithuanians suddenly want to be Nordic, and if we all want to
be Baltic, then historical relationships and common culture
will be discovered.2
It is unlikely, as well as being politically deeply incorrect, that the first-cited
vision of the Baltic is advocated today. On the other hand, there will be
many who would disagree with the postmodernist assumptions of the
Danish political scientist Ole Wæver, who seems to regard region-building
as a political project which uses the past to suit its own purposes and to
“invent” traditions and identity.
This essay seeks to steer a course between these two extremes and will try
to offer a circumlittoral perspective of the Baltic as a contribution to the
discussion on the identity of a Baltic region. A few general observations
may, however, be useful. In the first instance, the current concern with
“identity” is to a large degree a consequence of the shifting of the great
power blocs that dominated Europe from the end of the Second World War
until the last decade of the 20th century, and although there has been a
number of innovative studies looking at the spatial and chronological
dimensions of territory, much of the debate has been conducted with an eye
to present political concerns such as European integration or minority rights
issues. The discussion has also been almost exclusively about land and
territory; the role or impact of the sea has hardly featured at all.3
Secondly, it is important to draw attention to the fact that multi-ethnic
dominions, or “empires” have historically prevailed in the Baltic region. With
due acknowledgement to the existence of a strong sense of national identity
in medieval Denmark and Sweden at least, the nation-state as such is a
latecomer.4 One can speak of at least three distinctive and essentially
maritime conglomerations, by which I mean that the Baltic sea helped to
provide the means of expansion and bound the disparate elements
together: the early medieval Danish kingdom, and its two later rivals, the
Hanseatic League and the kingdom of Sweden.5 Insofar as one is justified
in speaking of a political “Baltic world”, then the period from the end of the
Viking era until the end of the 17th century is probably the most appropriate
for such a term. Post Ice-Age settlement of northern Europe, the
establishment of trading links with the rest of the world, even primitive state
formation was quintessentially maritime in nature.6 Sea routes were vital
arteries of trade and communication for large, sparsely populated land
masses, covered in thick, impenetrable forests, littered with bogs and stony
moraine. The open channel of water between the Stockholm skerries, the
Åland Islands and the Finnish archipelago was at the heart of the medieval
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perambulation (eriksgata) and Finland Proper.7 Control of the sea was an
essential element in the power struggle between Denmark and Sweden
after the final break-up of the Kalmar Union in the early 16th century,
something that was frequently recognised by Sweden’s great statesman,
Axel Oxenstierna.8
This began to change with the demise of Sweden as a great power.
Although there remained a dense network of maritime interregional
connections that paid little heed of formal national boundaries, the new
“empires” that began to play a commanding role in the Baltic – the Russian
from the early 18th century, the German in the 19th – depended far less
upon control of the sea to maintain their dominance. Both were essentially
continental land powers, and although access to the sea was an important
component in the creation of an image of statehood and power (especially
at the turn of the 19th century, the golden age of geopolitics), the extension
and assertion of territorial control was seen largely in terms of armies, not
navies. Furthermore, the Baltic was no longer the mother of all trades to
anyone. Although peasants and small merchants dealing in fish, firewood,
wooden artefacts, skins and furs kept alive a kind of cultural “Baltic world”, it
had become a backwater in terms of global trade and it no longer brought
the great European powers to the negotiating table as it had done in the
mid-17th century.
Out of the ruins of empire in 1918 emerged a number of small states around
the eastern rim of the Baltic. For these newly independent states, the
establishment of a national identity was of paramount importance; any
“Baltic” dimension was invariably seen from that perspective, and tended
moreover to be adapted to other concerns – most notably the delineation of
physical and mental boundaries against the east, the “other” of Bolshevik
Russia9. The division of Europe after 1945 split the Baltic; furthermore, the
southern shores were subjected to huge demographic changes, which
removed entire historic communities and brought in large numbers of
newcomers with no knowledge of the history or traditions of the war-torn
areas they moved to. The sudden ending of the division of Europe in 1991
has added yet another twist to the search for identity, with the re-emergence
of states sustained by a high level of nationalism, and yet having to
accommodate to a Europe in which supranational cooperation and
integration are the passwords for admission.
In our study of the Baltic and North seas, in which we cast a broad view
from the earliest settlements on the shores of the seas emerging from the
last Ice Age up to the present time, my co-author Merja-Liisa Hinkkanen
and I sought to trace the intertwined history of human culture in all its
aspects with that of the maritime environment. We tried to show how the
sea determined the lives and livelihoods of coastal dwellers, affected their
customs and beliefs and defined their mental as well as commercial
maps.10 Until the ending of the age of sail, coastal dwellers formed their
own distinctive communities, often with little regard to territorial boundaries
and few ties to the hinterland beyond the trade routes. The coastal
communities of northern Jutland had far more communication, and culturally
far more in common, for example, with southern Norway than with the
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impossible. There are numerous signs of Norwegian influence in the
villages of Vendsyssel and Thy, from the grain barns in Norwegian style to
Norwegian gravestones and ovens. There was also considerable emigration
from the coastal settlements to the towns of southern Norway.11 Even in the
remotest places, such as northern Sweden, a port could have significant
impact on the hinterland. Pastor Per Læstadius noted in the early 19th
century how the coastal town of Skellefteå influenced the upland parish of
Arvidsjaur, which “could be regarded as a colony of the former”. The dialect,
habits and dress of Skellefteå were all to be found in Arvidsjaur, and the
peasants who engaged in sea trade were looked up to as role models to be
imitated.12
The great trading cities were for centuries powerful enough to defy attempts
to subordinate them to the direction of a central princely authority; indeed,
the Hanseatic League in its prime was able to force princes to accept its
terms. But even modest coastal communities were able to evade many of
the irksome burdens and controls imposed by centralising state authorities
on those who lived in the more fertile and densely populated plains of the
hinterland. Isolated on the margins of the kingdom or duchy, the seafaring
peoples of these communities ate different food, wore different clothes, and
spoke a very different dialect or even language to that of their landlubber
neighbours. Unlike other distinctive and separate communities, such as
marsh-dwellers or mountain folk, however, maritime communities were
more likely to live in areas which in the 19th century acquired increasing
commercial and political importance, as a “paradoxical result of the fact that
the emergence of a world market went hand in hand with the formation of
national states”, in the words of the Danish historian Poul Holm13. The
quickening pace of economic activity and the impact of technological
change compelled coastal dwellers to adapt, but it were above all the
policies of powerful centralising states that wrought the most lasting
changes. It is the impact of new and different norms and values upon
maritime communities around the Baltic which will form the main element of
this paper, and particular attention will be paid to the ways in which the sea,
coast and coastal communities were redefined to fit in with a national
self-image.
As already indicated, coastal communities from the earliest times had been
open to external influences, and this gave them a distinctive character.14
From the end of the 18th century, however, these communities were
increasingly exposed to a new influence that did not flow through them, as
did the commodities, customs and fashions of the wider world, but which
sought to capture or reshape their very essence. This “discovery” of the
seaside, which within a short space of time created a new industry, actually
predated the formation of the modern national state, yet in many ways
anticipated it.15 It relied on much of the social and economic infrastructure
that was necessary in the building of the modern state: a prosperous urban
middle class, good communications, modern comforts. The early venturers
to the coast may have been looking for the exotic and untouched, as they
claimed; but nature in all its rawness was not something favoured by those
who followed in their footsteps. Having described in detail the rugged, rocky
coastline of Bohuslän on Sweden’s west coast, a Swedish tourist guide of
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be convinced that nature itself intended it to be what it has only just become
after many centuries – a bathing station”16. Visiting the remote northern tip
of the Jutland peninsula in 1859, Hans Christian Andersen, one of the most
powerful image-makers of his age, urged painters to hasten there to find “an
aspect of nature which will give you a picture of Africa’s desert, of the ash
heaps of Pompeii and of sandbanks in the great ocean above which birds
soar”. Here we have an image of wild, unspoilt nature, so dear to the
Romantic heart. But Andersen was also very enamoured of progress, and
he visualised a time in the not too distant future when
the houses of the town will stand in rows, each with its own
small front garden, there will be streets and roads out to the
open highway which leads to Fredrikshavn, the terminal for
the Jutland railway down to the Continent, and a port with
steamships which in a few hours link Norway, Sweden and
Denmark17.
Andersen was not the only visitor to the seashore who sent back conflicting
messages. One is almost tempted to say that the encounter between the
outside visitor and the dwellers by the shore has much in common with that
between the European and the “primitive peoples” of Africa and Asia. The
many travel books, poems and novels of the first half of the 19th century in
which the shoreline and the sea are the main feature often convey a strong
sense of ambivalence about the people of the shore, as shown in the
juxtaposition of opposites, such as the wrecker and the rescuer. Much of
this reflects the uncertainties of the writers themselves, men and women
from the cultured classes on a mission to discover the “true people”, but not
always quite sure what to make of their findings. Even those such as the
Danish pastor Steen Steensen Blicher who were determined to dispose of
fearful myths of bloodthirsty, half-human wreckers drew attention to the
distinctive “otherness” of the coastal inhabitants. They were different not
only in their dress, physique, customs and language, but also in their very
character.18
The values and habits of the wealthier and more powerful intruders into the
lives of coastal folk affected the local culture. The demands of prosperous
middle-class visitors ensured that pleasant promenades, assembly rooms
and parks replaced the clutter and smell of fishermen’s huts; their money
also reshaped the local economy, as sailors and fishermen found it more
profitable to hire themselves and their boats out for pleasure trips, or to rent
rooms.19 There was, however, little social intermixing between visitors and
residents. The light holiday clothes of the visitors contrasted sharply with
the drab, heavy working garb of the locals, and there were frequent
tensions between the world of hard, unremitting work and the determination
of the visitors to indulge themselves in pleasure. It may well be, as some
have argued, that the encounter served to sharpen rather than to blur
differences, and there is evidence, from southern Sweden for instance, of a
reaction by locals against the tourist trade. But given the regularity and
growing importance of the tourist trade, few coastal communities would
have been immune to the influences of visitors who carried with them the
manifold signs and symbols of the burgeoning national state – newspapers,
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that could be played from scores by bands with mass-produced
instruments, a preference for hygienically produced foodstuffs, and a
familiarity with the sinews that bind a nation together, from railway
timetables to the school system.20
The visitors were themselves part of this new infrastructure of
standardisation and regulation. The railway was probably less important in
creating a seaside industry in northern Europe than it was in Britain – and
there is an interesting contrast to be made here between the essentially
middle-class, spa-type holiday-making that took place in Doberan or
Marstrand, for example, with the kind of lower middle-class and
working-class daytripping that became popular in Britain even before
Thomas Cook organised his cut-price railway excursions to the seaside in
the 1840s – but it may nonetheless be seen as the first serious challenge
since Roman times to the waterways as a means of communication.21 A
railway network bound the hinterland to the coast, allowing the cheap and
speedy transit of goods, bringing newspapers, mail-order catalogues, letters
and above all visitors to the coast. It also allowed people to leave to find
better opportunities elsewhere, and it caused opinions to circulate. One
need only consider the part played by the steamship, railway and telegraph
in the Schleswig-Holstein conflict to appreciate this. They also permitted the
formation of new types of association – commercial, religious, social and
political – which often cut across and weakened older communal ties. Of
course, coastal communities were not the only ones affected; but they
differed from inland regions in the weakening of their trans-maritime
connections by the growing centripetal pressures of national state-
formation.
This occurred in several ways. The advent of the steamship and the
concentration of tonnage in the bigger ports, together with changes in
patterns of ownership, gradually brought about a shift towards a new
intermediary class of seafarers. Those who had once skippered vessels in
which they had a part-share now sought work in the large ports as pilots,
customs officials, fishery inspectors, harbourmasters and as captains
employed by the big shipping companies. Those who had crewed these
vessels now signed on as deckhands, stokers or mechanics – or found
work in the docks, factories and shipyards. The seasonal and local rhythm
of small-scale coastal trade survived, but in much reduced circumstances.
The same is true of fishing and boat-building; they survived and their
practitioners were often able to adapt to new technologies, but they were no
longer at the heart of the local economy.22
These practitioners also had to be fitted into a national self-image.
Fishermen were frequently held up as good examples. A reading-book
widely used in Swedish elementary schools, for example, portrayed the
fisherman as devout and content with his lot. Carl Koch’s 1874 novel Strand
und See painted a highly romantic picture of hardy, brave, Germanic fisher
folk, excellent sailors, who were the core of the new German navy.23 And
the sea had not only to be claimed for the middle classes as a source of
health, pleasure and relaxation; it had also to be claimed for the nation. This
is a fairly powerful refrain of German nationalism from the early 19th century
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and geest of Schleswig-Holstein, published in the 1840s, Johann Georg
Kohl for example made considerable play of the “Germanness” of the coast,
and of Prussia as the successor of the Hanse, “der unser Interesse vertritt
[an der Ostsee, DK]”. The development of the Zollverein, the building of a
canal linking North and Baltic seas, and the creation of a German merchant
fleet all underlined the need for national unity.24 In common with other
states around the Baltic, the new German empire also actively supported
marine exploration. The Ministerial Commission for Studying the German
Seas, set up in 1869, sent out expeditions in 1871 and 1873 and the
German research steamer Poseidon conducted regular expeditions from
1903 onwards. The close involvement of the new German state in marine
exploration was highlighted in the first number of an annual series on
Meereskunde, issued by the Institut für Meereskunde in Berlin. In addition
to the didactic and instructive, the new museum was to serve another
purpose: as its chief founder and tireless propagandist Freiherr Ferdinand
von Richthofen remarked in a speech of 1900, it served to make the
“Binnenbewohner” (“inlander”) aware of the harbours of his country as the
points of exit to the world ocean, and aware as well of the value of the
protection afforded by the new German fleet against foreign attack.25
The coastline could also become part of the front line in national conflict, in
more senses than the building of naval harbours and coastal batteries. After
the loss of Sylt and Föhr to Germany in 1864, Fanø was developed and
promoted as a “Danish” resort, and patriotic Danes demonstrated their
loyalty on the beaches of Denmark by ostentatiously flying the Dannebrog
in order to discomfit German visitors.26 The placing of the Finnish pilot
service under the control of the Imperial Russian ministry of the marine in
1912 prompted mass resignations and the replacement of some of these
men by Russians with an inadequate knowledge of Finnish coastal waters.
Within Finland itself, those who spoke on behalf of the Swedish-speaking
minority, which lived largely in coastal areas, claimed the sea and its shores
as their natural homeland, open and free, in contrast to the silent and
gloomy forests of the (Finnish-speaking) hinterland.27 The mutterings of
Russian geo-politicians about their country’s need for access to the sea,
and the betrothal to the sea staged by a detachment of Polish soldiers in
January 1920 may also be cited to highlight the perceived importance of the
sea for the national self-image.
The regional gave way before the national in other ways: in the gradual
demise of local dialects and languages, in the decay of ports and harbours
no longer able to keep up with changes in trade and shipping, or unable to
modernise, in the surrender or loss of local autonomy and self-government.
Many of the things that had sustained a maritime inter-regionalism were
now curtailed or faded away, “nationalised” by regulation or prohibition.
Maritime communities showed themselves capable of adaptation to
changed circumstances, as they had done in the past, and played an active
part in the process of transformation from the age of sail to the age of
steam. But they were undeniably a good deal less “maritime” at the end of
the 19th century than they had been at the beginning, and were to lose far
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I would like to conclude by returning to the question of identity and ask why
the many attempts at defining a Baltic identity have paid so little attention to
the sea itself. To a large extent, of course, this reflects the obvious fact that
we live on the land, not on the sea, but, besides, the waters do not easily
lend themselves to easy definition.28 It is also significant that the principal
name by which the sea is known is the Ostsee, the mare quod vocant
orientale, for this is surely a characterisation of the sea and the region by
western outsiders, or those coming from the west, who penetrated the area
for purposes of trade. This has been reinforced in much of the literature
concerning the Baltic – it is seen as the outlet to the wider (western) world
of commerce and culture, the conduit for the reception of ideas, goods,
institutions, etc. Although studies of trans-Baltic trade have shown how
important this has been in the exchange of ideas and techniques, from
ship-building to traditions of popular culture, the Baltic is seen primarily as a
receptor and channel of transmission, not as a generator or inspirer of ideas
or visions.29 In other words, it lacks the historical and cultural resonance of
the Mediterranean, and, in comparison with the countries on the north-
western seaboard of Europe, there seems to have been little in the way of
absorption of a strong maritime (and specifically Baltic) identity into the
national self-image. A four-volume study of the history of Danish identity, for
example, says hardly anything about the part played by the sea in helping
to define the only European country whose capital is on an island which in a
bad winter could be cut off from the rest of the country for days, even
weeks.30 The ever-observant Kohl may have stumbled upon one
explanation for this when he recorded a conversation with a Danish naval
officer, who was of the opinion that the peasants on the islands earned their
bread too easily on land, and thus turned their backs on fishing and
seafaring. There is much evidence to suggest a firm belief that only poverty
and the lack of opportunity in the locality would force people to earn their
livelihood from the sea. Such marginality was hardly the stuff upon which to
build a national image.31
Another explanation of the relatively low profile of maritime identity around
the Baltic can be discerned in the observation of Theodor Fontane’s Baron
von Innstetten about the lack of contact between the inhabitants of the
coastal towns and their Cashubian neighbours in the novel Effi Briest, and
in the ethnographer Wolfgang Rudolph’s description of the role of harbours
as
Stätten fruchtbarer Begegnungen zwischen
Binnenlandbewohnern und dem Seevolk der eigenen
Nation, ebenso aber Plätze permanent wirksamer Kontakte
zwischen Angehörigen oft sehr verschiedener Nationen,
zwischen Vertretern unterschiedlicher
Glaubensgemeinschaften und gegensätzlicher politischer
Weltanschauungen.32
Ports and maritime regions are essentially zones of transmission between
the hinterland and the outer world; their function and even existence are
determined by their role as intermediaries. The rhythm of their life is usually
quite different from that of the hinterland; they are more susceptible to
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attached, often rather uneasily. This created and sustained an inter-
regionalism which was in the end incompatible with the ambitious objectives
of the strong, highly centralised states of the 19th century, whose maritime
policies saw the coast as a frontier to be defended or from which the drive
for global dominance could be launched. In truth, many of the vital elements
of that Baltic maritime community were also weakened by commercial and
technological developments, and by the opening up of the coast to tourism;
but the modern state alone had the power to force conformity to standards,
to impose tariffs, to build navies and set national norms.
It remains to be seen whether a new maritime regionalism can flourish in
the Baltic in an age of European integration. There is plentiful evidence of
efforts to revive or create regional identities, but what at the present
moment may be a political and economic necessity is not necessarily the
same as the historical experience of regional identity. At any given time or
locality, there will probably be several layers operating simultaneously,
creating a multiplicity of contacts, exchanges, influences and fusions that
constitute the archaeology of identities within a broad territory on the
northern periphery of Europe.33 And, because the sea is in the end a
common resource linking the littoral states, a rich repository of identities, of
which many are fragile or have been lost altogether, there is perhaps a case
to be made for greater consideration of this maritime heritage in the ongoing
search for a “Baltic identity”.
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